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[Crim. No. 7014.

In Bank.

Oct. 25, 1962.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT
KARL SIDENER, Defendant and Appellant.
(1a, Ib] Poisons-Offenses-Punishment.-Where a charge that
defendant in a narcotics prosecution had been previously convicted of the same offense was found to be true by the trial
court, the judge, at the hearing on probation and sentencing,
could not dismiss the charge of prior conviction in the absence
of a motion for dismissal by the district attorney as required
by Health & Saf. Code, § 11718. That statute is not invalid
as being in violation of Const., art. VI, § 1, vesting the judicial
power of the state in the Senate and in the various courts, or
of Const., art. III, § 1, dividing the state govcrnment into legislative, executive and judicial departments and providing for
the separation of powers of such departments, since courts are
not the only public agencies constitutionally empowered to
determine the punitive consequences of recidivism. (Disapproving statements or implications to the contrary in People v. Burke,
47 Ca1.2d 45, 52 [301 P.2d 241]; People v. Valenti, 49 Ca1.2d
199, 206 [316 P.2d 633J.)
[2] Id.-Offenses-Punishment.-In Health & Saf. Code, § 11718,
providing that in a narcotics prosecution no allegation of fact
which, if admitted or found to be true, would change the
penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty would
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, §§ 35, 48; Am.Jur.,
Drugs and Druggists (rev ed § 31 et seq).
Melt. Dig. References: [1,2] Poisons, § 16; [3,4] District Attorneys, § 11; [5] Constitutional Law, § 60.
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otherwise have been may be dismissed by the court or stricken
from the uccusatory pleading except on motion of the district
attorney, the Legislature has adopted part of the prosecutor's
common-law power of nolle prosequi, which included the power
to strike allegations that would increase punishment.
[31 District Attorneys-Powers-Nolle Prosequi.-The district attorney's common-law power of nolle prosequi has not been
abrogated by Const., art. VI, § 1, vesting the judicial power
of the state in the Senate and in the various courts.
f41 ld. - Powers - Nolle Prosequi. - The fact that Pen. Code,
§§ 1385, 1386, providing that a court may order a prosecution
dismissed and abolishing the entry of a nolle prosequi, were
necessary to give. to the courts the power traditionally vested
in prosecutors demonstrates that the common-law rule relating
to nolle prosequi was not ubroguted by the general language
of the Constitution vesting the "judicial power" in the coUrts
(Const., art. VI, § 1).
[51 Constitutional Law-Statutes-Wisdom.-Whether the Legislature has adopted the wisest and most suitable means of
accomplishing an object is no concern of the courts.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John F. Aiso, Judge. Affirmed.

)

Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgment of
conviction affirmed.
Ellery E. Cuff, Public Defender, Fred Kilbride and James
L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Norman H. Sokolow,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction on an information charging him with possession of
a narcotic (heroin) in violation of Health and Safety Code·
section H500. The trial court also found to be true the charge
that defendant had been convicted of violating the same
section in 1955. [1a] At the hearing on probation and
sentencing the trial judge refused to consider dismissal of
the charge of prior conviction on the ground that the district
attorney had made no motion for dismissal as required by
[3] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, District and Prosecuting Attorneys, § 13.
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Health and Safety Code section 11718. 1 Probation was denied
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11715.6) and defendant was sentenced
to an inerease'd term as a second offender. (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11500.)
The Legislature has determined that recidivists should be
punished more severely than first offenders (e.g., Pen. Code,
§§ 644, 1203, 3020, 3024, 3047-3048.5; Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11500, 11501, 11502, 11530, 11531, 11532, 11540, 11557,
11715.6) and has directed that charges of recidivism in narcotics cases shall not be dismissed except upon motion of the
district attorney.
Defendant contends that the power to dismiss such charges
is vested exclusively in the courts by article VI, section 12 and
article III, section P of the California Constitution, and that
Health and Safety Code section 11718 is therefore invalid.
This contention is unsound. Any statements or implications in
Peoplev. Burke, 47 Ca1.2d 45, 52 [301 P.2d 241], and People v.
Valenti, 49 Ca1.2d 199, 206 [316 P.2d 633], to the contrary
were not necessary to the holdings in those cases and are disapproved.
[2] In section 11718 the Legislature has adopted part
of the prosecutor's common-law power of nolle prosequi, which
inclnded the power to strike allegations that would increase
punishment. (State of Maine v. Burke, 38 Me. 574, 575;
Anonymolls, 31 Me. 590; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20
Pick.) 356, 364-367; Commonwealth v. Briggs, 24 Mass. (7
Pick.) 177,178-179; Baker v. State of Ohio, 12 Ohio St. 214,
217-218.) [3] That power, hundreds of years 01d 4 and

"'In any criminal proceeding for violation of any provision of this
division no allegation of fact which, if admitted or found to be true,
would change the penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty
would be if such fact were not alleged and admitted or proved to be true
may be dismissed by the court or stricken from the accusatory pleading
except upon motion of the district attorney."
·"The judicial power of the State shall be vested in the Senate, sitting
as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme Court, district courts of appeal,
IUperior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts."
'''The powers of the Government of the State of California shall be
divided into three separate departments-the legislative, executive, and
judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the other~, except as in this Constitution expressly
directed or permitted."
'An incident related in 2 Campbell's Lh'cs of the Chancellors 173 is of
interest in this connection. After he had ordE'red the imprisonment of a
croup ot fanatics called "Prophets" for seditious language, Lord Holt
was visited by Lacy, one of their friends, who informed a servant that he

)
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still recognized in mallY jurisllictiulls Ilflving constitutional
provisions essentially idcnti<:al wii It 8l'etion 1 of artiele VI
(United Stafes v. Brokaw (D.C. II!.) 60 F.Supp. 100, 101;
State v. Broussard, 217 La. :)0, !:Ii) [-16 So.2<1 48] ; Stale v.
Kearns (Ohio Com. Pl.) 129 N.E.2d j43, 543; State v. CharIeR,
183 S.C. 188, 194 [190 S.E. 466] ; see 69 A.L.R. 240, 241-243),
was not abrogated by that section. The phrase "judicial
power" cannot reasonably be given a meaning that it has never
before been thought to have in this or allY other state to
invalidate an act of the Legislature. Courts are not the only
public agencies constitutionally empowered to determine the
punitive consequences of recidivism.
The contention that prosecutors have ncver had the commonlaw power of nolle prosequi in this state is based solely on
the enactmrut at the first and second legislative sessions (Stats.
1850, ch. 119, p. 323; Stats. 1851, eh. 29, p. 279) of the predecessors of Penal Code sections 1385 and 1386. 5 Thus it was a.
legislative act, not a constitutional provision, that deprived
prosecutors of such power in California. In the exercise of the
same power by which the 1850 and 1851 Legislatures rejccted
nolle prosequi, the 1959 Legislature chose to restore it in part.
[ 4] The fact tha.t sections 1385 and 1386 were necessary to
give to the courts this power traditionally vested in prosecutors demonstrates that the common-law rule was not abrogated
by the general language of the Constitution vesting the" judicial power" in the courts.
The Legislature has never completely rejected the prosecutor's common-law power of nolle prosequi. The same Legislacarried a message" from the Lord God." Lar.y was admitted and told
Lord Holt: "I come to you a prophet from the Lord God, who has sent
me to thee, and would have thee grant a nolle prosequi for John Atkins,
his servant, whom thou hast cast into prison."
Lord Holt replied:
"Thou art a false prophet, an,1 a lying knave. If the Lord God had
sent thee it would have been to the Attorney·General, for He knows that
it belO1lgeth not to the Chief Justice to grant a nolle prosequi; but I,
a8 Chief Justice, can grant a warrant to commit thee to bear him com·
pany." (See Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice (9th ed. 1889)
§ 383, p. 268, fn. 2.)
'Section 1385 provides: "The court may, either of its own motion or
upon the application of the pros('cuting attoTlley, anil in furtherance of
justice, order an action to be di~missed. The r,'n"ons of the dismis.nl
must be set forth in an orcler eniered lIpon the l1linllj·l'~. No dismh~al
shall be made for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the
accusatory plealling."
Section 1386 provides: "The entry of a nolle pro~eqlli is abolishecl,
and neither the attorney-general nor the district attorney can discontinue
or abandon a prosecution for a public offense, except as provided in the
last section."
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ture tlmt cuaetcd tlle pr('dc(!essors of section 1385 and 1386 in
1850 and 1851 also adopted the predeccssor of Penal Code
section 1099 which provides: "When two or more defendants
are included ill the same accusatory pleading, the court may,
at any time before the defendants have gone iuto their defense,
on tlte application of the prosecuting attorlley, direct auy
defendant to be discharged, that he may be a witness for the
people." (Italics added.) In People v. Bruzzo, 24 Ca1. 41, this
court was confronted with the question whether a court had
authority without a motion for dismissal by the district attorney to dismiss a joint defendant so that he might become a
witness for the people. The distriet attorney, as in the present
case, had dcclined to move for dismissal. It was held that" The
Court has no power to discharge Bruzzo at common law, nor
under the Act of 1851, 011 the motion of his own counse1."
(24 Cal. at p. 51.)
The Bl·lIZZ0 case demonstrates that the power of dismissal
is not vested exclusively in the courts, but may be given to the
prosecutor by the Ij('gislature. Health and Safety Code section
11718 giws the district attorney the same power with respect
to dismissal or charges of recidivism in narcotics cases that
Penal Code section 1099 gives him with respect to dismissal
of charges against joint defendants. Both sections are a partial
legislative adoption of the prosecutor's eommon-Iaw power of
nolle prosequi.
The Bruzzo rase cannot be distinguished on the ground that
dismissal of a cbarge of a prior conviction is effective only for
sentencing purposes. The common-law power of nolle prosequi
in<'luded dismissal of the prosecution entirely or any separable part thereof. Charges could be dismissed by entry of a
nolle prosequi before the jur~' was impanelled, while the case
was before the jury, or after vcrdict. (See Wharton, Criminal
Pleading and Practice (9th ed. 1889) § 448, p. 313; 14 Am.
Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 296-298,pp. 967-968; 22A C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, § 457a, pp. 3-4.)
The meaning of constitutional provisions, however, is not
static, and the scope of jud~cial po",:er is not found in history
alone. The definition Rnd classification of public offenses and
the punishment therefor arc legislative matters. (Harbor
Comrs. v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491, 493 [26 P. 375,
22 Am.St.Rep. 321]; Ex Parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21; Moore v.
Municipal Court, 170 Cal.App.2d 548, 556 [339 P.2d 196].)
If charges have not been dismissed pursuant to the authority
granted by the Legislature, the court must pass sentence as
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pt'eseribed by statute (Pen. Code, § 12) and may not illlPose
any sentence other than that prescribed. (People v. Gonzales,
36 Cal.App. 782, 784 (173 P. 407] ; see also Pen. Code, § 1203
et seq. relating to probation and suspension of sentences.)
[1 b] The charge of a prior conviction in the present case
has not been dismissed pursuant to legislative authority. The
court found that the charge was true and was therefore bound
to impose the sentence prescribed by law. The court could
no more dismiss this charge without statutory authority than
it could dismiss a charge against any defendant convicted of
murder, arson, rape or any other crime. A court may feel
that the punishment prescribed by the Legislature for a
recidivist narcotics offender is too severe or that by dismissing
one or more charges punishment can be imposed that would
better serve to rehabilitate him. To dismiss the charges in the
face of Health and Safety Code section 11718, however, would
be a flagrant usurpation of legislative power and an arrogant
affectation of wisdom in the matter of punishment and rehabilitation superior to that of the Legislature. Certainly article VI,
section 1 and articlc III, section 1 do not endow courts with
such power.
The fact that prior convictions are now given greater weight
than they once were does not distinguish them from the host
of other considerations of penology that are now given greater
or lesser weight than they once were or compel the conclusion
that their punitive effect is for the courts alone. Like premeditation or malice aforethought in homicide or bodily harm
in kidnapping, prior convictions have been made operative
facts for the determination of punishment. Every day prosecuting attorneys exercise broad powers in this respect. It is
they who decide what crime is to be charged or if any crime
is to be charged. (Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Ca1.2d
671, 676 (227 P.2d 14] ; see Klein, District Attorney's Discretion Not to Prosecute, 32 L.A.B. Bull. 323-334; Note,
Private Prosecution: A Remedy for D·istrict Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 Yale L.J. 209; Remington & Joseph,
Oharging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Oriminal
Offender, '1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 530; Wright, Duties of a
Prosecutor, 33 Conn. B.J. 293-295.) Moreover, it is only
because the Legislature so directed that they are bound to
charge all prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 969) once the decision to prosecute is made. It would exalt form over substance
to hold that broad constitutional principles of separation of
powers and due process of law permit vesting complete dis-
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cretion in the prosecutor before the case begins, but deny him
all such discretion once the information is filed.
There are innumerable facts other than the commission of
the crime itself that may have far more bearing on the punishment imposed than prior con\'ictions. If not only their existence but their effect on punishment must be determined solely
by courts, the indeterminate sentence law and the legislative
restrictions on the court's power to grant probation must fall.
The indeterminate sentence law has been sustained, however,
on the theory that a conviction carries with it judicially determined liability for the maximum sentence and that any remission from tl1at maximum may be determined by an administrative agency (In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692-693 [171 P. 958] ;
Inre Wells, 35 Ca1.2d 889, 893 [221 P.2d 947]; In re Smith,
33 Ca1.2d 797, 804-805 [205 P.2d 662]), subject only to
limited judicial re\'iew_ (In re McLain, 55 Ca1.2d 78, 87 [9
Cal.Rptr. 824, 357 P.21l 1080].) The Legislature could provide
life imprisonment as the maximum term for all narcotics convictions without possibility of probation, and it could leave it
solely to the Adult Authority to determine the punitive effect
of prior convictions. It could set out standards to govern the
Adult Authority and provide for judicial review of its findings
with respect to relevant facts. It might, for example, provide
that prior convictions should be determined, not at the trial
but by the Adult Authority at a subsequent hearing subject
to judicial review. Surely it could not reasonably be contended
that in such a review proceeding the judicial power included
not only a revie,v of the facts, but the power to instruct the
Adult Authority to ignore them.
The Legislature has been given express constitutional power
to determine what officers, agencies or boards m~y exercise
the power now exercised by the Adult Authority and the scope
of such powers.s The Legislature is authorized to provide that
part of the powers that might otherwise be exercised by the
Adult Authority alone shall be exercised by district attorneys_
CArticle X, section 1 (formerly section 7) of the California Constitution provides: "The Legislature may provide for the establishment, government, charge and lIuperintendence of all institutions for all persons
convicted of felonies. For this purpose, the Legislature may delegat.e the
government, charge and superintendence of such institutions to any public governmental agency or agencies, officers, or board or boards, whether
now existing or hereafter created 11y it. Any of such agencies, officers, or
boards shall have such powers, perform such duties and exercise such functions in respect to other reformatory or penal mntters, as the Legislature
may prescribe. ' •

)
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In determining that the district attorucy rather than the
Adult Authority or the trial court shall ha"e primary respollsibility for determining the punitive consequences of recidivism in the illdividuaillureotics ease, the Lcgislature in the
exercise of its cOllstitutiollal power has simply chosen one
. public officer rather than au other. Some judges may think
they are best qualified to make this determination ; some district attorneys may think they are; others may think that
neither judges nor district attorneys should be entrusted with
that responsibility. In section 11718 of the Health and Safety
Code the Legislature has designated the district attorney as
the officer that can best effect the public policy of the state.
[5] '" [I]t is not our concern ,vhether the Legislature has
adopted what we might think to be the wisest and most. suitable means of accomplishing its objects.' " (State of California v. Industrial Ace. Com., 48 Cal.2d 365, 372 [310 P.2d 7],
quoting City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal.2d 804, 811
[306 P.2d 453].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J.,Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my view section 11718 of
the Health and Safety Code t (both by its terms and as applied
here during the trial of the defendant in the superior court
on the felony charge of possessing a narcotic drug in violation
of section 11500 of the same code) is unconstitutional under
both the United States and California Constitutions in that it
denies the defendant due process of la,v in the adjudication of
material issues affecting probation and sentence (U.S. Const.,
5th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13). In particular,
section 11718 has deprived the defendant at bench of his
constitutional right to have a judicial officer (the trial judge)
hear, and in the exercise of discretion vested exclusively in
that officer determine, the important question of dismissal of a
charge of a prior conviction (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 1, 5; Pen.
~

'Health and Safety Code section 11718, enacted in 1959, provides:
, 'In any criminal proceeding for violation of any provision of this
division [" Narcotics," H 11000-11797] no GllegGtilm of ftlCt [in an indictment or information] whil'h, if admitted or found to be true, would
change the penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty would
be if such fact were not alleged and admitted or prol"ed to be true mGY
be dismi8sca by the court or strickc. from the GCCUBGtory pZeGdi1lg except
upo. motion of the di8trict Gttorney." (Ita.lies added.)

I
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Code, §§ 995, 1238, and 13852 ); furthermore, by subjecting
the exercise of an inherently judicial function to the unreviewable discretion of a member of the exeeuth'e branch, the subject
section violates the constitutional requirement of separation of
powers (Cal. Const., art. III, § 1).
The general asseverations of the majority as to the powers
of the Legislature to fix punishments for criminals, to differentiate among crimes and between first offenders and recidivists, and to prescribe the conditions for probation or parole,
etc., are of course unquestioned. But the elaboration of such
undoubted fundamentals should not be allowed to obscure the
issue. Certainly the Legislature could absolutely prohibit the
granting of probation or parole to anyone convicted of a narcotics (or any other) offense; or it could ordain any minimum
and maximum terms it sees fit, or a mandatory life term without parole or even a nondiscretionary death penalty for such
offenses. But thc Legislature cannot-without transgressing
our constitutional division of powers-transfer from the judicial to the executive branch of government the power either
to grant or to deny, or to preclude judicial resolution of, a
motion made prior to entry of judgment in a felony criminal
action, the ruling on which will affect the substantial rights
of the defendant under the judgment to follow.
Section 11718 actually goes farther than to transfer a seg'Section 1385 reads: "The court may, either of its own motion or upon
the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice,
order an action to be dismissed. The reasons of the dismissal must be set
forth in an order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal shall be made
for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory
pleading. "
Section 995 defines certain situations (none of which, as such, is mate·
rial here except as recognizing the inherent power of the court to act)
wherein the "indictment or information must be set aside" upon motion
of the defelldallt.
Section 1238 evidences implied powers of tbe trial court by providing
that" An appeal may be taken by the people:
"1. From an order setting aside the indictment, information, or
complaint; •..
"5. From an order made after judgment, affecting the substantial
rigbts of the people;
"6. From an order modifying the \'t!rdiet or fimling hy reducing the
degree of the offense or the p\lni~hment imposed."
It should be noted here (as is hereinllfter in tbe text shown in more
detail) that the power to control the eausc--inrlll<ling the power to dis·
miss or to set asirle an accusatory pleading or portion thereof-is not
created by the mentioned colle sections. That power stems from the
Constitution and is merely regulated procedurllll!l hy the (lirectives of
the pertinent statute, sueb as, e.g., section 1385, requiring that the rea.
sons for the dismissal of an action be set forth in an order entered in
the minutes.
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mcnt of the judicial power to the cxccutive. It unquestionabJy
purports to curtail the jurisdiction of the court by granting to
the district attorney the unreviewable and absolute power
(with no standard prescribcd for its cxercise) to preclude the
judge from exercising any discretion in ruling on a motion in a
criminal action for an order which would substantially affect
the defendant's eligibility for probation, parole and the tcrms
of his imprisonment. It bears reiteration that the Legislature,
of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation,
parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot abort the
judicial process by subjecting a judge to the control of the
district attorney.
Section 11718 by its very terms tacitly recognizes-as under
the Constitution is implicit-that the court has jurisdiction to
entertain and pass on a motion for the relevant relief. But as
to the judge's exercise of the court's jurisdiction in ruling on
any such motion the statute directs that "no allegation of fact
[in an indictment or information filed with the court] which,
if admitted or found to be true, would change the penalty for
the offense charged from what the penalty would be if such
fact were not alleged and admitted or proved to be truc may
be dismissed by the court or stricken from the accusatory
pleading except upon motion of the dist1'ict attorney." (Italics
added.) Constitutional jurisdiction of the court to act cannot
be turned on and off at the whimsy of either the district attorney or the Legislature. The power to act under our system of
government means the power of an independent court to
exercise its judicial discretion, not to servilely wait on the
pleasure of the executive.
The majority summarize (ante, p. 646) the trial court's
action on the question of dismissal of the charge of defendant's
prior conviction, but fail to quote the following illuminating
language of the trial judge:
"THE COURT: ... Is there any legal cause why judgment
should nbt be pronounced and sentence passed'
"MR. KILBRIDE [deputy public defender] : I am in doubtthere is no legal cause other than I do not know yet what the
decision of the District Attorney was.
"THE COURT: I will let that be made known to you at this
time. The District Attorney after due deliberation has declined
to initiate a motion to strike the prior conviction alleged. It
[Health & Saf. Code, § 11718] therefore ties the hands of thi.~
Court in which the Court has 110 discretion." (Italics added.)
Accordingly, the court (deeming the subject statute to be
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valid) did not in the exercise of its jurisdiction determine, but
was compclled by the district attorney's action to deny, probation (Health & Saf. Code, § 11715.6 post, fn. 12) and to sentence defendant to state prison for an increased term (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11500). The judge's action in imposing the
increased term was compellcd not by legislative determination
that the longer term prescribed in section 11500 must in any
event follow conviction of the offense, but only by the determination of the district attorney-on no standard prescribed
by law-that as to this particular defendant he would preclude the court from exercising its discretion in a matter
which otlwrwise was within thc court's jurisdiction. In other
words, the district attorney exercised his absolute discretion
and section 11718 compelled the judge to abdicate the function
of his office. In the next case to follow, before the same judge,
the district attorney (again subject to no prescribed standard)
might elect to permit that defendant to have the benefit of the
judge's exercise of discrction on the same motion. Has the
defendant here had due process and equal protection of the
law!
The Legislature, of course, could have prescribed the longer
punishment for conviction of the offense defined; but it could
not transfer from the judicial to the executive-from the judge
to the lawyer for the state-any part of the judicial power;
nor could it create in the executive a totalitarian type of superpower to curb the judiciary. As declared by this court, unanimously, in Vidal v. Backs (1933) 218 Cal. 99, 104 [2] [21
P.2d 952, 86 A.L.R. 1134], " [W] e must bear in mind a fundamental principle of government applying to constitutional
courts to the effect that they constitute an independent branch
of government which cannot be hampered or limited in the
discharge of its functions by either of the other two branches. "
(Italics added.)
Article VI, section 1, of the California Constitution provides
that ,. The judicial power of the State shall be vested in the
Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme Court,
district courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts,
and justice courts." Section 5 of the same article specifies that
"The superior courts shall have original jurisdiction in all ...
criminal cases amounting to felony .... " The criminal action
against defendant, which was on trial in the superior court
when the judge's power was curtailed by force of the district
attorney's action in reliance on the statute, charged simple
possession of a narcotic, a felony. Neither section 11500 nor
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section 11718 of the Health and Safety Code distinguishes
between simple possession by a sick addict and like possession
by a nonaddiet. A trial judge can-for obvious humanitarian
reasons-make that distinction. It is this power of the trial
judge to temper the universality of a harsh law which makes
this case important to the cause of justice. It is important to
the integrity of our constitutional government for reasons
which will be more fully developed.
Significantly, neither in article VI nor elsewhere in the
Constitution is there to be found a definition of the content
of the phrase, "The judicial power of the State," as used in
section L It follows that a necessary corollary to that general
language is the principle that "Our courts are set up by the
Constitution without any special limitations ; hence the courts
have aud should maintain vigorously all the inherent and im.
plied powers necessary to properly and effectively function as
a separate department in the scheme of our state government."
(Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 442 [1] [281
P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507].) The latter principle was described
by this court as long ago as 1929 as being" now undebatable"
(id. at p. 442) ; the integrity of this holding has heretofore
been continuingly respected (see, e.g., Garrisonv. Rourke
(1948) 32 Cal.2d 430, 436 [3] [196 P.2d 884] ; J[irstowsky v.
Superior Court (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 745,753 [6] (300 P.2d
163)).
The implied powers of a constitutionally created court are
those which are necessary to enable it to properly and effectively exercise the fundamental judicial power granted by
article VI, section 1. " A court set up by the Constitution ha.<!
within it the power of self-preservation, indeed, the power to
remove all obstructions to its successful and convenient operation." (Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29, 33 [4] [293
P. 69] ; Rivas v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 195 Cal.App.
2d 406,409-410 [2] [15 Cal.Rptr. 829] ; Arc Investment Co. v.
TifJith (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d Supp. 853, 856 [7] [330 P.2d
305].) Certain of these implied powers have received legislative deJlnition;3 but in each instance the enactment neither
created nor circumscribed the powers thus defined. Thus, as
'Code of Civil Procedure section 128 provides:
"Powers respecting conduct of proceedings. Every court shall have
power:
"1. To preserve and enforce order in its immcilillte presence;
"2. To enforce order in the procce<1ings before it, or before a person
or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its
authority;
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hereinabove noted in footnote 2, th(' provision of Penal Code
section 1385 that" The court may, either of its own motion or
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed" is not a
grant of jurisdiction to dispose in a particular way of the
actions pending before it. The court, by 'virtue of the eonsti. tutional provisions above mentioned, already has the complete
power to fully adjudicate and, subject only to judicial review,
finally dispose of, all causes eueolJipassed in the constitutional
grant. The additional language in section 1385 (" The reasons
of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the
minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause which
would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading. ")
obviously does not limit the jurisdiction or power of the court
to control the justice of the cause but relates only to procedural
matters. The essentially inherent or implied powers of the
court are by their nature impradieable if not impos3ible of
all-inclusive enumeration. 4
"3. To provirle for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its
officers;
"4. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and
to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pend·
ing therein ;
"5. To control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto;
"6. To compel the attendance of persons to testify in an action or
proceeding pending therein, in the cases and manner provided in this
code;
"7. To administer oaths in an action or proceeding pending therein,
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of ita
powers and duties;
"8. To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to In wand justice."
Code of Civil Procedure section 177 provides:
"Powers of judicial officers as to conduct of proceedings. Every judicial officer shall have power:
"1. To preserve and enforce order in l1is immediate presence, and in
proceedings before him, when he is engaged in the performance of official
duty;
"2. To compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided in this code;
"3. To comWJI the attendance of persons to testify in a proceeding
before him, in the cases and manner provided in this code;
"4. To administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before
him, and in all other cases where it· may be necessary in the exercise of
his powers and duties."
'This fact is implicitly recognized, in one context, in Code of Civil
Procedure section 187:
"Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. When jurisdiction is, by the
constitution or this code, or by any other statute, conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also
aiveu; . . . J'
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The majority, trying to tind support· for the Legislature's
attempt to empower the executive to curtail the superior
court's jurisdiction in the premises, say that" In sectioll 11718
the Legislature has adopted part of the prosecutor's commOllla,v power of nolle prosequi, ,vhieh included the power to
strike allegations that would increase punishment." (Ante,
p.647.) In so stating, the majority purport to proceed from
the undocumented assumption (a lite, pp. 647-648) that in
California the common law power of llolle prosequi "was not
ahrogated by" the adoption of article VI, section 1, of our
Constitution. But the majority :l1eglect to point out that historically the common-law doctrine 01 'II01le prosequi appears
nevcr to have bcen in 101'ce in California. It is not shown to
have been a part of the Mexican law nor was it ever enacted
by the Legislature or otherwise adopted by the People. As the
majority appear to have overlooked these facts, a short excursion into legal history is necessary to demonstrate this proposition.
California, as a governmental entity, is not of common-law
ancestry. At the time of the first influx of American settlers
in the early 1840 's the operating judicial system was Mexican.
That system appears to have been rudimentary at best in the
southern portion of the province and nonexistent in the north.
(See Mason, C011stitutional History 01 California, in Constitution of the State of California and Other Documents (1961,
Calif. State Senate), p. 319; Wilson, The Alcalde System of
California (1852), in 1 Cal. 559, 574-575.) However, to the
extent that any laws of the central government of Mexico ,vere
in fact observed in California, the province was governed by
the Constitution of 1837 and the laws of March 20 and May 23
of the same year. 5 An examination of the law of May 23, relat·
ing to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts, the
duties and powers of the Attorney General, and civil and
criminal procedure, reveals no provision authorizing the Attorney General to exercise any power resembling nolle prosequi
under the common·law. And it may well be doubted that a
custom to that effect existed, in view of (1) the traditional
civil·la,v emphasis on the authority of the magistrate, and (2)
the necessarily broad powers exercised by the alcaldes and
"The llltter enactments llre set forth in rclcmnt part in Halleck, Translation anll Digest of such portions of the Mexican Laws of March 20th
nnd MllY 23d, 1837, llS llre supposed to be still in force and adapted to
t.he present conditions of California (1849), rcprinted in Browne, Debates
in the Convention of California (18.30), Appentlbr, pp. XXIV-XL.
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justiccs of the peace in meting out the primitive justice ofa
remote and t.roubled province. s
Neither the proclamation of the California (Bear Flag)
R!'pnblic on June ]4, 1846, nor thc military conquest and
occupation of California beginning July 7, 1846, nor the ultimate cession of California to the United Statcs by the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo (February 2, 1848) operated to abrogate existing local law. Although many of the American
settlers conducted their personal and business affairs by the
only guides they knew-the rules and customs of the common
law-they did so out of necessity and without authorization of
any governing body. By established principles of international
usage, when conquered or ceded territory is transferred to a
new sovereign "the law, which may be denominated political,
is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse, and general conduct of individuals, rcmains in force,
until altered by the newly cr!'ated power of the state."
(American Insurance 00. v. Oanter (1828) 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
511,542 [7 L.Ed. 242] [Louisiana]; accord, Oross v. Harrison
(1853) 57 U.S. (16 How.) ]64, 198 [14 L.Ed. 889] [California] .)
The fact that existing Mexican municipal law remained in
force in California to the extent that it was not in conflict with
the Constitution or laws of the United States, was repeatedly
recognized during the subject period. It was asserted, for example, in the proclamation of General Kearny (March 1,
1847) taking command of the military government of California under orders of President Polk; in the proclamation of
Colonel Mason (August 7, 1848) announcing ratification of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; and in the proclamation of
General Riley (June 3, 1849) calling the first constitutional
convention. T The need to make more widely known the content
of such existing local law led to the publication, by order of
General Riley (July 2, 1849), of Halleck's Translation and
Digest of Mexican Laws (ante, fn. 5), said to be "intended

)

'''The Mexican Constitution of 1844, partially adopted in Mexico, was
never regarded as in force in California, nor was it known here that these
laws [of March 20 and May 23, 1837] wcre materially modified by any
decrees or orders of the Mexican Congress." (Hnlleck, p. XXV (ante,
fn.5).)
'In the latter proclnmation it was observed, for exnmple, that" The
laws of California, not inconsistent with the laws, Constitution and
treaties of the United States, are still in force, and must continue in
force till changed by competent authority." (Reprinted in Browne, De·
bates in the Convention of California (1850), p. 3.)
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us a temporary guide and assistance to the inferior officers
of GoVel'lmH'nt, till more complete treaties can be prepared
by competent persons." (Ibid.) And the early volumes of
thcCaliforuia Reports are replete with decisions of this court
applying such local law, often as elucidated by Spanish and
Mexican writers, in causes ,vhich arose in the years prior to
1850. Thus, "Between the transfer of California to the United
States, by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the admission
of this state into the Union,no territorial government was
here established. The purely municipal law of Mexico continued in force within this territory until modified or entirely changed by appropriate authority." (Lux v. Haggin
(1886) 69 Ca1.255, 335 [4 P. 919, 10 P. 674].)
Nor did the adoption and ratification of the Constitution
of 1849 operate to directly adopt nolle prosequi or even to
abrogate existing local law iu ally material sense. It is true
that most of the provisions of that Constitution were modelled
on corresponding provisions of the Constitutions of Iowa,
New York,and other common law jurisdictions (see Sanderson, C. J., dissenting in Bourland v. Hildreth (1864) 26 Cal.
167, 258; see generally Hunt, The Genesis of California's
First Constitution (1895» and that "In determining the
meaning of a constitutional provision, it will be presumed
that those who framed and adopted it were conversant with
the interpretation which had been put upon it under the
constitution from which it was copied" (Lord v. Dunster
(1889) 79 Cal. 477, 485 [21 P. 865]). But the latter is a rule
of construction only, which must give way before contemporary evidence of a contrary intent. Here such evidence is
ample to show that in adopting the Judicial Article--or any
other provision--of the Constitution of 1849 the framers did
110t intend thereby to substitute the common law for existing
Mexican law as t1le rule of decision in California. This intent
\vas made plain by the adoption ·of section 1 (If the Schedule
to the Constitution, ,vhich provided in relevant part that
"all laws in force at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, until altered or repealed by the Legislature, shall continue as if the same had
not been adopted." (Reprinted in Stats. 1850, p. 34.)
Any doubt that might otherwise exist as to the matter was
set at rest by the first session of the Legislature. On April
13, 1850, that body passed an act declaring that" The Common
Law of England, so far a., it is '1Iot repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Con-

Oct. 1962]

PEOPLE !}. SIDENER
{58 C.2d 645; 25 Cal.Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641]

661

stitution or laws 01 the State 01 California, shall be the rule
of decision in alltlle Courts of tIl is State." (Italics added.)
(Stats. 1850, ch. 95, p. 219.) II Shortly thereal'ter the Legislature explicitly provided in section 630 of the Criminal
Practice Act (Stats. 1850, ch. 119, p. 323) that "Neith(>r tbe
Attorney General, nor the District Attorney, shall hereafter
discontinue or abandon a prost'cution for a public offense, E'X. cept as provided in the last section [§ 629, now Pen. Code,
§ 1385, ante, fn. 2]."9 . (See also Pen. Code, §§ 1099, 1100.
1101, specifically providing immunity for a party d~f"'lH'lnllt
when the charge against him is dismissed by the court in order
that he may be a witness either for the People (§ 1099) 01'
fora codefendant (§ 1100).) Finally, the Legislature passed
an act declaring that "all laws now in force in the State, except such as have been passed or adopted by the Legislatur!',
are hereby repealed. . . . " (Italics added.) (Stats. 1850, cll.
125, p. 342.)
As the common law power of nolle prosequi was manifestl.,r
"repugnant to or inconsistent with . . . the laws of the State
of California" as expressed in section 630 of the Criminal
Practice Act, supra, it is obvious· that although the Legislature adopted the common law as the general rule of decision
it expressly declined to adopt that portion of the common
law which vested the power of nolle prosequi in the prosecutor. Section 630 of the Criminal Practice Act was re-enacte(l
almost verbatim by the second session of the Legislature as
section 598 of the Criminal Practice Act of 1851 (Stats. 1851,
ch. 29, p. 279) and that statute remained in force until superseded in 1872 by Penal Code section 1386.10 The addition at
that time of the words, "The entry of a nolle prosequi is
abolished," was explanatory and confirmatory only; i.e., it
"It is interesting to note that in his message to the Legislature (December 21, 1849) Govcrnor Burnett had recommended the adoption of the
English law of evidence and the English criminal and commercial law,
and the Louisiana Civil Code and Code of Practice. A petition in support of the Governor's proposal was referred to the' Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, which filed a report (February 27, 1850) reviswing at
some length the 1'espeetive merits of the civil law and the common law.
and recommending adoption of the latter. (Report on Civil and Common
. Law, reprinted in 1 Cal. 588·604.)
·Sections 629 and 630 were based, tespectivcly, on sections 671 and 672
of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.
"Section 1386 provides as follows: "The entry of a nolle prosequi is
abolished, and neither the attorney-general nor the district attorney can
discontinue or abandon a l'rosecution for a public offense, except as provided in the last scction."
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added nothing except confirmation to thc legal effect of its
predecessors under the 1850 and 1851 acts for manifestly it
could not then abolish that which had never existed in California. l1
The majority's appeal to the history of England and of
such states as Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Louisiana and
South Carolina serves but to emphasize the lack of authority
under California law for the Legislature's attempt to transfer a portion of the superior court's constitutionally granted
jurisdiction from the judicial to the executive department of
government. The question of how the defendant's case is
decided is of little importance to anyone other that the defendant; but the question of who decides it-the district attorney or the court-is of major importance to all citizens
as well as to the defendant, to whom it denies due process.
As hereinabove observed, the implied powers of the courts
are impracticable if not impossible of all-inclusive enumeration. Yet they flow from a common source--the authority
of every court "to control the proceedings before it insofar
as the essentials of the judicial process are concerned"
(People v. Burke (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 45,52 [6] [301 P.2d 241]).
The concept of what is an essential part of the judicial
process, however, is neither static in quality nor fixed in time.
"In this connection the majorit;r cite People v. Bna:ro (1864) 24 Cal.

.n, but the case is not relevant to the issue before us. The record there

showed (id. at p. 51) "a case of joint indictment; joint trial; a request
or call by the Prosecuting Attorney for one of the defendants for the
purpose of examining him against the other two; he takes the stand vol·
untarily in answer to the call: he invites and without objection takes
the oath in its most comprehensive form, and, under instructions which
he has previously solicited, and to which he takes no exception when
given, criminates his associates and himself; and on these antecedents
the counsel of the witness, in pursuance of a notice previously given,
moves the Court not merely to discharge the witness from the particular
prosecution, but to finally acquit him, i'3 effect, of the crime alleged
agaiMt him." (Italics added.) It was held that "The Court has no
power to discharge Bruzzo at common law, nor under the Act of 1851
[i.e., Stats. 1851, ch. 29, p. 252, ~ 368, now Pen. Code, ~ 1099], on the
motion of his own counsel." (Ibid.) But no such power is here in ques.
tion, as the dismissal of a charge of prior conviction is effective only for
sentencing purposes and does not expunge that conviction from the de·
fendant's record. Nor is the reference in Brllsso to the common lnw of
any significance here. It cannot be taken to imply that the common law
was adopted in this state by the Constitution of 1849, as it has been
shown hereinabove that the fact was otherwise. And although the court
in Bl"U::ZO looked to the common law as well as to the statutes in search
of evidence of tIle judieial power t),ere un<1!'r ,liscussion, it docs not
follow from that fact tlmt in the case at h('nl'h the ('ommoll law power
of nolle prosequi should be deemed to have somehow been adopted
despite it.s express rejection by the first ~l's~ion of the Legislature.

Oct. 1962]

PEOPLE

v. SIDENER

663

{58 C.2d 645; 2:; Cal.Rptr. 6!)7. 375 P.2d 8411

. Its scope necessarily changes as the machinery of the admini .. tration of justice changes, to meet the new conditions and
needs of a developing society. To define the essentials of
the judicial process exclusively in terms of the law as it
stood in earlier stages of that development "would be to
make of stale usage a strait-jacket confining our constitutional grants of power, and would be directly contrary to
the view of the Constitution as a document expanding , "to
meet the advancing affairs of men.'" (People v. Western
Air Lines, Inc. [1954] 42 Cal.2d 621, 635 [19] [268 P.2d
723].)" (California Motor Express, Ltd. v. State Board of
Equalization (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 237, 242 [5b] [283 P.2d
1063].) The real issue, therefore, is not whether the hearing
and determination of the question of dismissing a charge of
prior conviction was an essential part of the judicial process
in 1849 or 1872 or 1879; rather, the issue is whether such
hearing and determination is today an essential part of that
process.
Only recently we had occasion to point out that "The
statutory rules of pleading and procedure in criminal actions
today are not only different from, but in certain aspects arc
contraversions of, those which existed under the Practice
Act of 1851 and even under the Penal Code prior to the
amendments of 1915 and 1927." (People v. Tidernan (1962)
57 Cal.2d 574, 578 [1] [21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007].)
In this century alone there have been many changes in the
criminal law, both substantive and procedural, which give
a force and effect to a charge of prior conviction, if found
to be true, that could not have been foreseen by the framers
of our two Constitutions and our first codes. This effect is
now felt throughout the entire judicial process. To begin
with, the charging of all known prior convictions is now
mandatory on the district attorney. (Pen. Code, § 969; In
re Tartar (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 250, 254-255 [la, 2, 1b, 3] [339
P.2d 553] ; see also People v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d
394, 401 [9] f14 Cal.Rptr. 279]; People v. Dunbar (1957)
153 Cal. App.2d 478, 479 [1] [314 P.2d 517] ; People v. Ashcraft (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 820, 826 [5] [292 P.2d 676].)
The finding that a defendant has suffered two or more prior
convictions of certain felonies will now result in an adjudication of habitual criminality (Pen. Code, § 644), with
its attendant effect in extending the minimum term of imprisonment that 11e must serve before being eligible for
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pal·olc(ic7., §§ 3047·30-18.:;) .EwlI if lie is not auju<lged an
habitual criminal, a fiutling of prior cOllviction of certain
felonies will now either diminisb or destroy his eligibility
for probation (id., § 1203), and may result ill a mandatory
increase in the minimum term that can be fixed by the
Adult Authority under the Indeterminate Sentellee Act (id.,
§§ 3020, 3023, 3024).
More particularly with respect to narcotics violations,
the statutes (Health & Saf. Code, div. 10) in force at the
time of defendant's cOllviction (5 October 1960) gave substantial effect to a finding of priOl' convictioil. Elevcn offcns<,s
were then defincdil1 chapter 5 ("IUl'gal Narcotics") of
division 10 of the codt>, and in rl'gal'd to no less than eight
of them the statute provided for mandatory charging of
prior narcotics eonvictions and for iucreascdpunishment
dependent on corresponding findings (id., §~ 11500, 11501,
11502, 11530, 11[;31, 11532, 11540, 11557). Thus, the court ill
ihe caf;e at bel1eh (presuming the valiclity of Health & Saf.
Code,§ 11718, ante, fn. 1) was compelled to deny probation
(id., § 11715.6) 12 and to sentence defendant to state prison for
the statutorily increased term of two to twenty years,. rather
than the basic term of not more than one year in county jail
or not more than ten years in state prison. 13
In this connection we may take note of the fact that the
difference, from the standpoint of punishment and rehabilitation, between treating a man as a first offender and giving
effect to a prior conviction will be even greater under the new
narcotics laws. Section 11500 was amcnded in 1961 (Stat.,;.
1961, ch. 274, § 1) to provide, in the case of. one prior felony
narcotics conviction,14 that the defendant "shall be im"Section 11715.6 provided in relevant parta~ follows at the time of
defendant's conviction: "In no case shall any person convicted of [any
of the narcotics offenses defined in div. 10, ch. 5, of the codel .•• be
granted probation by the trial court, nor sllaH the execution of the sentence imposed upon such person he suspended by the court, if such person
has been previously convicted of IIny offense described in this division
[except § 11721, use of narcoticsl . . . "
The 1961 amendment to section 1171:;.6 (Stats. 1961, ch. 274, § 12)
adds references \0 two new narcotics offenses (H 11500.5 and 11ii30.::;)
but makes no SUbstantial changes in the ,vording or effect of the section.
1IHealth and Safety Code section 11500, liS it provided at the time of
defendant's conviction.
'
"Health and Safety Code section 11504 (added by Stats. 1961, ch. 274,
§ 5) provides: "As used in tliis article nrt. 1, "Illegal Sale, Possession,
Administration and Tmnsportntion"l 'felony offense~' aud offense 'pun·
ishable as a felony' refer to an offense for which the law prescribes

r
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prisoned in the state prison for not less than five years nor
more than 20 years, and shall not be eligible for release upon
completion of sentence, or on parole, or on any other basis
until he has served not less than five years in prison." (Italics
added.) In the case of two or more prior narcotics convictions the corresponding term is now from 15 years to life,
with a required minimum time served of 15 years. (Ordinarily,
of course, a prisoner "whose minimum term of imprisonment
is more than one year, may be paroled at any time after the
expiration of one-third of the minimum term." (Pen. Code,
§ 3049.» The remaining sections of articles 1 and 2 of chapter
5 (tc Illegal Narotics") were similarly amended (Stats. 1961,
ch. 274, §§ 2-11), increasing in each instance the punishment
imposed and the required minimum time served in cases of
one or morc prior narcotics c0l1yictions. 15
The conclusion is ineseapable that a charge of prior conviction which is found to be true now has serious and far
imprisonment in the state prison as either an alternath'e or the sole
penalty, regal'lUcs8 of the 8entence· the particular defendant received."
(Italics added.)
"For convenience of reference, the following chart sets out the respective effects, under the new narcotics laws, of striking, or of not striking
and finding to be true, one or more charged prior felony convictions:
Health & Safety
Code sections
11500
Simple possession (except
marijuana)

j
I

!

Disposition of
priors charged

i Prior struck or found

I

! Minimum I Maximum M;:~m
i Sentence Sentence
served
I (years) I (years) (years)

I ; I ~g

~

not true:
1 prior found true:
2 or more priors
found true:
15
life
\ 15
Prior struck or found
11500.5
not true:
Possession for
2%
1 prior found true:
sale
6
\
2 or more true'
15
life
15
Prior struck or found
11501
Sale or gift or
not true:
life
5
3
offer to give
1 prior true:
10
life
10
or transport • 2 or more true:
15
life
15
or furnish
11002
Pnor struck or found
Sale or gift
not true:
10
life
5
1 prior true:
10
life
10
to minor
:-=-=:-=-____ 2 or more t;.:r.;;u:.:.e.:.,:::----:---:._--=1;..:5:-.._....----=I:...if;..:e:.---:-_l;::,5=--_
11502.1
I Prior struck or found I
Minor's sale or I not true:
5
life
gift to minor 11 or more found true:
10
life

-

I

I

(Footnote continuea OIl lUa:t pGfJe.)

I

I

\ Ig

I ~~e

!

I

I

I

I
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reaching effects on the punishment of the offender, and hence
on the possibility of his eventual rehabilitation. This being
so, the hearing and determination of the important question
of dismissing such a charge for the purpose of individualizing punishment and encouraging rehabilitation-which is
to the ultimate benefit of society as a whole, and which chiefly
distinguishes modern penology from the older conceptsmust today, more importantly even than in the past,be
deemed an essential part of the judicial process. And the
power to hear and determine that question must, under the
'principles set forth hereinabove, be deemed an implied constitutional power of the courts of this state. IS
Neither section 11718 nor section 11500 takes cognizance
of the fact that there is a vast difference between the culpability of a 'l/,Q1I.-addict possessor-pusher on the one hand,and
on the other, that of the sick and impoverished addict who,
desperate for the drug, pushes it in order to possess it. Trial
judges-before enactment of section 11718-could recognize
that difference and (by striking a charged prior in what the
evidence and their experience told them was probably a

,~)

I

I

I

I

11530
Prior struck or found
Simple possesnot true:
sion of
1 prior true:
marijuana·
2 or more true:
11;)30.5
Prior struck-or found
Possession of I not true:
marijuana
11 prior true:
for sale
,2 or more true:
11531
Prior struck or found
Sale or gift
not true:
or import or
1 prior true:
transport of
! 2 or more true:
marijuana
11532
Prior struck or found
Sale or gift
not true:
of marijuana
1 prior true:
to minor
2 or more true:

I

I

II

I

1
2
5

10
20
life

1
2
5

2
5
10

10
15
life

I
3

8

5
5
10

life
life
life

3
5
10

10
10
15

life
life
life

5
10
15

"It may Le observed that there appears to be medical opinion that
mnl'ijuana is tess habit forming and less toxic to tbe human system than
is tobacco. It seems obvious, therefore, that at some later date a court
may be considering some equally drastic enactment with respect to tohacco. It is not many years since 'We did face quite similar laws affecting
possession of alcoholic beverages.
"1 am thus in full agreement with the Committee on Criminal Law
nnd Procedure of the State Bar of California which, in its recent report
to the Board of Governors recommending that the 'State Bar sponsor the
repeal of section 11718, gave as its opinion that" To make the prosecuting offieer the only person who can move to set aside a prior conviction,
takes away all judicial diseretion in pronouncing sentence nnd is a legislative encroachment upon proper judicial power." (35 State Bar J. 432
(1960).)
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descrving ease) give to the Adult Authority greater scope to
treat such an addict as an illdividual-a very sick and helpless individual, but in some eases a person who could be
rehabilitated and cured.
Referencc to the chart in footnote 15 makes it obvious that
the Ileed for judicial discretion (in contrast to prosecutor's
zeal) may be even more important in cases wherein violation
of Health and Safety Code section 11532 is charged. Under
that section a youth-exactly 21 years old (with one prior
charged and found true)-who shared a marijuana cigarette
with another youth one day younger, would be absolutely
required to actually serve 10 years in prison. With the prior
struck the youth, if the Adult Authority saw fit, might be
paroled after a minimum of five years served. In either case, it
is to be noted, whether the charge of prior conviction was
struck or found true, the maximum sentence open to the Adult
Authority is life imp1'isonment. In its application to a situation of this kind section 11718, aside from being unconstitu,
tional, is a throwback toward an abandoned concept of penology. It works at cross-purposes with the indeterminate
sentence plan and objectives,
In connection with the foregoing discussion it should be
remembered that the dismissal or striking from an accusatory
pleading of an allegation of prior conviction does not preclude the Adult Authority from considering the fact of a
prisoner's prior conviction in fixing the term of imprisonment
and the time for and conditions of parole, if any. The direct
and important effect of the court's dismissal or striking of
the charge is to broaden the area of the Adult Authority's
discretion in fixing the minimum term of imprisonment in
deserving cases. But solicitude of the law for the protection
of society against confirmed offenders makes sure that the
Adult Authority shall be acquainted with all facts which may
militate against early, or cyen any, parole, The statutes
provide that: c, The Director of Corrections shall keep complete case records of all prisoners under custody of the department, ' . ,
"Case records shall include all information received by
the Director of Corrections from the courts, probation officers,
sheriffs, police departments, district attorneys .. , and other
interested agencies. , . ," (Pen. Code, § 2081.5.) Reports of
court dispositions arc mandatory. (Pen. Code, §§ 11115, 11116;
see also Pen. Code, §§ 3020, 3024, 3041, 3046.) Furthermore
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"any persoll who is hereaftrr dischal'ged or parolrd from a
penal institution where he was confined because or th" commission of any such [narcotics] ofi\'llse ... shall within thirty
days . . . of his coming into any county or city . . . register
with the chief of police . . . or the ;;heriff" (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11850).
Just six years ago in a substantially similar context the
same question was presented to us and we deliberately considered and passed on it (People v. BlI?'ke (1956) 47 Cal.2d
45 [301 P.2d 241]). We were then unanimous and we held
(at p. 51 [4]): "The power to strike or dismiss the proceeding as to a prior conviction is within the power referred to
in section 1385 of the Penal Code, which provides that 'The
court may, either of its own motion or upon the application
of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice,
order an action to be dismissed. . . .' The authority to dismiss the whole includes, of course, the power to dismiss or
'strike out' a part. . . .
"[6] The People argue that by providing in section 11712
of the Health and Safety Code that if a prior conviction,
whether of misdemt'anor or feJony, 'is admitted by the defendant, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison' (italics
added) the Legislature intended to take from the court the
power to dismiss or strike a charge of prior conviction if the
defendant admits the charge. According to the People, the
trial court was required to sentence defendant to state prison
and the judgment should be reversed for the purpose of
directing it to do so ....
"[P. 52] The cited cases-and the statutes referred todo not purport to divest the trial court (or to hold that the
court constitutionally could be divested) of the power to
control the proceedings before it insofar as the essentials of
the judicial process are concerned; i.e., to find the defendant
guilty or not guilty of any offense charged, or of a lesser included offense, or to dismiss the action in toto or to strike or
dismiss as to any or all of multiple counts 01' charges of prior
conviction. The'statutes in question do validly-and in respect
to constitutionally vested judicial power they neither purport
to nor validly could do more than-prescribe the sentence
which must be imposed upon the appropriate adjudication
of guilt of the substantive crime and judicial determination
of the factor which results in increased punishment. Such
adjudication and judicial determination are inherently and
essentially the province of the court even as the punishment
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which mayor must follow the offense adjudicated, either with
or without a punishment augmentation factor, is essentially
for the Legislature except as it may vest an area of discretion
ill the court or administrative body. (See People v. Gowasky
(1927) 244 N. Y.451 [155 N. E. 737,749,58 A.L.R. 9, 17].)"
(See also People v. Be11jamin (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 164, 173
[15] [315 P.2d 896] ; People v. Green (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d
886, 891 [6] [313 P.2d 995] ; People v. Harris (1956) 146
Cal.App.2d 142, 147-148 [7] [304 P.2d 178].) And only five
years ago, again unanimously, in People v. Valenti (1957) 49
Ca1.2d 199, 206 [9] [316 P.2d 633], we further recognized
that a charge of prior conviction may be dismissed by the
court "in the exercise. of [its] inherent power to control
the proceedings before it," and that section 1385 is merely
"evidential of" that power.
The broad scope of the judicial power in this area of its
jurisdiction, although sometimes attacked by zealous prosecutors, has not been seriously doubted until today. As the
District Court of Appeal said in People v. Superior Oourt
(1921) 53 Cal.App. 185, 186 [199 P. 840] (relying on this
court's decision in People v. More (1886) 71 Cal. 546 [12 P.
631]), "We think that respondent [superior court] has
jurisdiction to dismiss the action for any reason that it determines to be in furtherance of justice." To the same effect is
People v. Jfartin (1924) 70 Cal.App. 271, 276 [6] [233 P. 85] :
"The action of the trial court on such a motion [to dismiss
under Pen. Code, § 1385] is discretionary." In People v.
Smith (1925) 76 Cal.App. 105, 111 [5] [243 P. 882], the
court declared: "At most, the motion [by the district attorney] for a dismissal is merely a recommendation to the
court. If the court, for any reason, differs with the district
attorney ... there can be no doubt that the court has a full
right to refuse such dismissal." And in People v. Ward (1890)
85 Cal. 585, 590 [24 P. 785], we held, "It is clear ... 'the
court' alone has the power to dismiss a criminal action."
The Legislature may enact reasonable regulations to be
observed in carrying out the constitutional functions of the
courts (such as prescribing the records to be kept and the
procedure by which jurisdiction is to be exercised) "provided
they do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those
functions." (Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929), supra, 208
Cal. 439, 444 14].) Here, it is apparent that the effect of
Health and Safety Code section 11718 was to utterly defeat
the exercise by the trial court of the above delineated judicial
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function. The court felt tl1at it had .. no discrction," and that
the statute "tied the hands" of the court. It follows that
section 11718 effectively deprived defendant of his constitutional right to a "judicial determination of the factor which
results in increased punishment" (People.v. Burke (1956),
supra, p. 52 [6] of 47 Cal.2d), and hence denied him due
process of law in the important matter of probation and sentencing. (U.S. Const.,5th and 14th Amends.; Ca1.00nst.,.art.
I, § 13.)
Furthermore, it is to be noted, the jurisdiction held by the
majority to beexeised by force of Health and Safety Code
section 11718 is not only the original jurisdiction. of the
superior court but also the potentialappellatc jurisdiction
of this court. In People v.VaZent·i (1957), supra, 49 Cal.2d 199
207, we specifically approved the holding in the Burke case
that the trial court's order striking the allegation of prior
conviction "was appealable, not because it was made • in
furtherance of justice,' but because, as we there stated (p. 53
[8] of 47 Cal.2d) it ',vas in its nature one of the orders specified as appealable either by paragraph 1 or by paragraph 6
of section 1238 of the Penal Code. That statute provides
that the People may appeal" 1. From an order setting aside
the indictment, information or complaint; . . . 6. From an
order modifying the verdict or finding by reducing the
degree of the offense or the punishment imposed." The trial
court's action was in substance .. an order setting aside [a
part of] the •.• information." , Since the But'ke case order
did not involve either the cause of adion itself or any
question of jeopardy it was clearly proper to hold, as we
did, that it 'was in substance "an order setting aside [a part
of] the ... information" , and, consequeI;ltly, that as to appealability it should be governed by the rules applicable to
orders setting aside the information rather than by those
applicable to orders dismissing the action." Thus it is
established law that if the district attorney feels that the trial
court has abused its discretion or erred in an order setting
aside or striking a part of an accusatory pleading the remedy
of appeal is available. But if, as the majority today hold,
seetion 11718 effectively transfers to the district attorney
unreviewable authority to compel the trial court to deny
the motion-or to not even consider and pass on it~then illIlecd is the defendant denied due process both in the trial
court and (to resist on plaintiff's appeal) ill this court,
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The Scpa1'ati01~ of Powers
Article III, section 1, of the California Constitution provides-as it has provided in substance since adoption of our
first Constitution (i.e., since 1849)-that "The powers of the
government of the State of California shall be divided into
three separate departments-the legislative, executive, and
judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except
as in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted."
It is my view that section 11718 of the Health and Safety
Code is unconstitutional for the further reason that, both
on its face and as here applied, it violates this requirement of
separation of powers by subjecting the exercise of an inherently judicial function to the unfettered and unreviewable
discretion of the district attorney, a member of the executive
branch of government.
It will be remembered that section 11718 (ante, fn. 1) prohibits the trial court from hearing and determining the
question of whether a charge of prior conviction should be
dismissed, "except upon motion of the district attorney."
Under this statute, no matter how deserving the individual
case may be for judicial action, the court must wait upon the
permission of the district attorney before proceeding further,
and if such permission is not forthcoming the court's hands
are "tied" and it cannot act. As defendant correctly points
out, "The court is precluded from exercising its judgment
in a fact situation before it, unless the district attorney gives
the judicial prerogative what might be termed a 'prior
approval.' " To endow a member of the executive department
with such a power is in effect to authorize him, in the language
of article III, section 1, to "exercise" one of the "functions
appertaining to" the judicial department.
It is true, of course, that in the complex state of modern
government the principle of the separation of powers should
not be treated as absolute, and that each branch of government
must of necessity and in some degree exercise certain functions
of the others. But that principle nevertheless requires, when a
judicial function is exercised by a member of the executive
branch, that ultimate control over its exercise be retained by
the courts through the medium of judicial review. Much of the
increasingly elaborate structure of our administrative agen.cies, as is well known, has been erected and sustained upon
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tl1is foundation. Under the subjt'rt statutl', however, a decision
of the district attorney not to initiate a motion to dismiss
is not reviewable by any court in any type of proceeding. Thus,
on the present appeal, we cannot review the propriety of the
district attorney's decision itself,but must confine ourselves
to examining the authority under which it was made. Indeed,
even in a case where, for example, the prior narcotics offense
occurred a half century carlier and the defendant successfully
served a period of probation, was rehabilitated and became a
useful member of society, the district attorney would not be
judicially accountable for a refm'al to allow the trial court
to consider dismissing the charge of the old conviction and
treating the defendant as a first offender. Section 11718 i:-;
therefore invalid for this reason also, as non reviewable or ultimate judicial power ma~' not constitutionally be delegated to a
member of the executive department. (Cal. Const., art. III,
§ 1; Laisnev. California State Board of Optometry (1942) 19
Cal.2d 831, 835 [3] [123 P.2d 457).)
Nor can it be presumed that the district attorney will act
with judicial impartiality in exercising this power. The majority assert (ante, p. 651) that "The Legislature is authorized
to provide that part of the powers that might otherwise be
exercised by the Adult Authority alone shall be cxercised by
district attorneys." But the Adult Authority has nothing
whatsoever to do with the judicial process leading to entry
of judgment. It has no po\ver to superintend the trial of cases
in the courts or to participate in any way in the determination
of the guilt or innocence or the scope of the judgment of
conviction of any person who is brought to trial in the superior
court on a charge of felony. Manifestly the power of the Legislature to provide for the administration of prisons and prisoners is not the equivalent of authority to transfer a judicial
function to the executive department.
The proposition asserted by the majority is based on article
X, section 1, of our Constitution, which provides in relevant
part that "the Legislature may delegate the government,
charge and superintendence of [state prisons] to any public
governmental agency or agencies, officers, or board or boards .
. . . " In enacting section 11718, say the majority, "the Legislature in the exercise of its [just quoted] constitutional power
has simply chosen one public officer rather than another."
(Ante, p. 652.) It appears to me that this contention lacb
substance as support for the majority's essential conclusion
that the Legislature effectively transferred from the superior
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court judge to the district attorncy the jurisdiction to adjudicate this phase of the criminal action against uefclldant. To
authorize the prosecutor to sit in final judgment on the resolution of one of the substantial issues in the case of People v.
Sidener while this case was· on trial in the superior court is,
in my opinion, flagrantly to disregard the painfully learned
truths which are the very foundation of our constitutional sys·
tern of government. If indeed the Legislature has here "simply
chosen one public officer rather than another," the choice is
110t only a dangerous and unwise one-it nakedly violates the
letter and spirit of both the Constitution of California and
the Constitution of the United States.
If Health and Safety Code section 11718, in seeking to
secure its objective, went one step further and declared that
no application to the Govcrnor for pardon, or commntation of
sentence, imposed for a narcotics offense "may be" granted
"except upon motion of the district attorney," would such
transfer of jurisdiction even from one executive officer to
another in the samc department of government be sustained?
The vesting in the Governor of the constitutional powers of
pardon and commutation, subject to control in certain situations by the Supreme Court, is no more exclusive than is the
vesting of judicial power in the constitutional courts.
I am 110t unmindful of our duty to so construe legislation as
to save its constitutionality if that can reasonably be done
(Erlich v. Municipal COll1't (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 553, 558 [1] [11
Cal.Rptr. 758, 360 P.2d 334] ; Geiger v. Board of Supervisors
(1957) 48 Ca1.2d 832, 839 [11] (313 P.2d 545J ; Palermo v.
Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 53, 60 [5] [195 P.2d
1]), bnt in my view section 11718 of the Health and Safety
Code admits of no donbt either as to its meaning or as to its
effect. In these circumstances "the duty of the court is plain,
and should be fearlessly performed." (Van Harlingen v.
Doyle (1901) 134 Cal. 53, 56 [66 P. 44, 54 L.R.A. 771] ; cf.
City of Los Angeles v. Offner (1961) 55 Cal.2d 103, 113 [7)
[10 Cal.Rptr. 470, 358 P.2d 926).)
Apart from principle the step taken by the majority today
may not be a big step. But in principle it is indubitably a step
toward totalitarian concentration of power in the executive; a
power to be exercised without any legislative standard and
without possibility of judicial review. As applied here it
deprives the defendant of due process and of equal protection
of the law.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded
•
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for judicial determination, which in the circumstances means
for redetermination in the light of the views herein expressed,
of the question of dismissal of the charge of defendant's prior
conviction, and for pronouncement of a new (but not necessarily different) judgment in accordance with such determination.
McComb, J., concurred.

)

WHITE, J., Dissenting.-I am in accord and concur with
the historical narrative and legal reasoning contained in the
dissenting opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Schauer.
While the Legislature is empowered to place certain reaS011able restrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts,
nevertheless, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Schauer, the legislative prerogative in that regard is limited to such restrictions
as "do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those
[judicial] functions." And, as recently as 1956, in Peop~e v.
Burke, 47 Ca1.2d 45 [301 P.2d 241], this court held that the
determination of the factor which results in the imposition of
increased punishment is inherently vested in the courts.
I view with alarm this invasion of the powers of the judicial
department of government by the legislative department. If
the power of the courts, in the interest of justice, to control
the dismissal of a prior conviction can be made subject to the
approval of the district attorney, then what is to prevent the
Legislature from providing that the finding as to whether an
allegation of a prior conviction is true or untrue under the
laws of this state shall also be vested in the district attorney T
I sometimes think we are inclined to' forget that under our
philosophy of government the district attorney is but the
representative of just another litigant in a criminal prosecution. He is invested with the powcr to institute prosecutions
but once he has done so, the determination of the truth or
falsity of such accusations is for the courts.
Another alarming feature of the statute here' under consideration is that, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Schauer, it takes
away all juliicial discretion in the pronouncement of sentence
and invests the district attorney with plenary power to control
the pronouncement of judgment without any right of judicia~

review.
Such an enactment under the American way of life seems
to me the very essence of slavery and a return to the philosophy of "the Divine Right of Kings." After all, the district
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attorney cannot bcrcgarded as impartial. He is essentially
an advocate who, believing in the justice of his cause, is seekingcouvictioll .and punishment of the accused. To make llim
also the court of last r('sort as to what punishment should be
imposed, without ailY impartial tribunal to review his decision
'in the matter of senteneing, seems to me to do violence to our
concept of constitutional government, and offends our ort
repeated and proud boast that we are a government of law
and not of men.
I regard section 11718 of the Health and Safety Code, now
engaging our attention,as a legislative encroachment upon
proper judicial power and therefore, unconstitutional.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the
court below for further proceedings as set forth in the last
paragraph of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer.
McComb, J.,concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November
21, 1962. ,Schauer, J., and MeComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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